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APPELLANT'S REPLY 
In their Opposition to Plaintiff's Opening Brief, defendants argue that 
Idaho has adopted the common law, and that the common law "prohibits continuation of 
a personal ittjury action upon the death of a plaintiff." Defendants further contend this 
appeal is "frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation" and request attorney's fees 
and costs. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff agrees with defendants that Idaho has adopted the common law, 
unless abrogated by statute, and the issue presented has not been addressed by the Idaho 
legislature. Plaintiff disputes defendants' contention that the common law provides that 
in actions arising ex delicto, a plaintiff's claim for both non-economic and economic 
damages abate. 
Although plaintiff has agreed with defendants that the common law in 
Idaho presently holds that claims for non-economic damages for such things as pain and 
suffering abate, the common law in Idaho is unclear regarding claims for economic 
damages in such circumstances. 
Defendants concede that had plaintiff been married, her claim for 
economic damages would not have abated. Plaintiff's position is that "the community" is 
the same as "the estate" of the deceased Leeann Craig. 
IDAHO LAW 
In the point that follows it will be explained how the United States 
Supreme Court got all the state Courts off track by creating the belief that wrongful death 
and survival statutes were needed to override the common laws. 
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This statute, when enacted, created a new cause of action 
that did not exist at common law. Whitley v. Spokane Ry. 
Co., 23 Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913); See also, Gavica v. 
Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Hughes v. 
Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10, 169 P.2d 712 (1946). Thus, the 
right of a person to recover for the wrongful death of 
another is statutory, and a person seeking to recover must 
qualify under the statute. Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 
P.2d 859 (1942) * * * Our legislature wished to change the 
common law to allow recovery for wrongful death, while at 
the same time limiting that recovery .... " - Everett v. 
Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 789-90, 673 P.2d 387, 389-90 
(1983) 
* * * 
Except for this statute, no such action could be prosecuted 
in this state and no such cause of action could accrue in 
this state. Webster1 v. Norwegian Mining Co., 137 Cal. 
399, 70 Pac. 276, 92 Am. St. Rep. 181; Burk:2 v. Arcata, 
etc., R.R. Co., 125 Cal. 364, 57 Pac. 1065, 73 Am. St. Rep. 
52; Munro v. P. C. D. & B. Co., 84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303, 
18 Am. St. Rep. 248. - Whitley v. Spokane Ry. Co., 23 
Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913) 
Whitley affirmed a wrongful death judgment for Mary Elizabeth Whitley, 
the mother of A. P. Whitley who was killed near Coeur d'Alene while a passenger on 
Defendant's railroad. A. P. Whitley left a wife but no children and the railroad settled 
1 Webster ( decided in 1902) held that a personal representative could not bring a wrongful death 
claim if there were no heirs, "if there are no heirs there can be no damage" - "At connnon law 
no such right of action existed." 
2 Burk (decided in 1899) remanded a wrongful death jury verdict of$1500 for the brothers and 
sisters of an married man because "The English courts held that only pecuniary loss could be 
recovered" and the plaintiffs had not shown any damage - "The majority of men die without 
much property'' - but that "The suit could have been maintained by the administrator for the 
benefit of the estate." 
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with his wife. Under Idaho law at that time the mother was also an heir. The Whitley 
court spoke of there being no wrongful death action "Except for this statute" but did not 
discuss the common law. 132 Pac at 123, 126. 
POINT TWO 
FAULTY IDSTORICAL PREMISE 
Many early court decisions in Idaho - and even some more recent ones 
- have perpetrated an erroneous belief that injury and negligence actions were 
extinguished upon the death of either the victim or the tortfeasor. Unfortunately, the 
United States Supreme Court played a big part in this misstatement of the common law 
and it took many decades to reverse. It the meantime there became a big body of law in 
the states that unfortunately lead to the dismissal of injury actions when the victim or 
tortfeasor died. 
To the extent Idaho law and the law of most states adopted the common 
law of England, the most important error to recognize - is that defense claims that an 
action did not exist at common law or did not survive the death of the victim - are 
invalid; the right to bring or continue an action is not in fact dependent upon a statute 
based on the belief that it was creating something that did not exist at common law. 
Every state has a wrongful death statute. 
In enacting these laws state legislators believed they were creating causes 
of action where none had existed at common law. Lawyers and courts have, therefore, 
often stated they had little choice but to defer to the legislature, parties to litigation "must 
take the bitter with the sweet." Arnettv. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,154 (1974) (plurality 
opinion, per Rehnquist, J.). 
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That assumption is wrong. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 27 
years ago in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 379,389 n.2 (1970), actions 
for wrongful death were, in fact, cognizable at common law, and in the American 
colonies, if not always in England. 
Historical research has proven that wrongful death statutes limit common 
law rights and do not bestow new rights. Thus, those statutes must be regarded as 
violating state constitutional guarantees, particularly the right to a certain or complete 
remedy. This is so regardless of a state legislature's ostensibly generous impulses or 
putatively good intentions. 
Origin of Confusion 
The confusion regarding the common law origins of wrongful death 
actions came from Lord Ellenborough's 1808 pronouncement that there was no tort action 
at common law for the death of a human being, made in Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (nisi prius 1808) ("in a civil court, the death of a human being cannot 
be complained of as an injury"). 
That statement was not only "obviously unjust" but also inaccurate and 
"technically unsound," as "based upon a misreading of legal history. "3 
Felony - Merger Doctrine 
The basis for the supposed absence of wrongful death actions at common 
law as the English felony-merger doctrine. Under this rule, common law courts routinely 
held that private suits for damages for an act that was also a felony were not tenable. The 
courts reasoned that because a civil tort against a private person was less important than a 
3 3 William Searle Holdsworth, History of English Law 336 (3d ed. 1927) 
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criminal offense against the Crown, the tort or "merged" into the felony. 
The doctrine found practical justification in the fact that wrongful death 
suits would never be filed because felons not only lost their lives but also forfeited all 
property to the Crown, rendering them effectively judgment-proof. Thus, after the crime 
had been punished, nothing remained of the tortfeasors' property on which to base a 
viable lawsuit. 
Recovery Theories 
However, even before the Norman Conquest in 1066, English courts had 
recognized that the accidental killing of a human being was a compensable wrong.4 
Indeed, far from being disenfranchised or disfavored at early English law, wrongful death 
claimants could sue under an assortment of legal theories throughout the Middle Ages. 
The "wer," the "wite," "the compromise," and the "appeal of murder" were all 
conventional causes of action by which the deceased's family could obtain compensation 
at ancient common law. 
For example, the wer and wite were reparations paid to the deceased's 
family and the Crown, respectively, in amounts based on the deceased's status or rank. 5 
The compromise was similar to an action for damages. 6 The "criminal appeal" was not 
4 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederick William Maitland, The History of English Law 48 (2d ed. 
1898) 
' See generally, Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, 1055 (1965) 
6 See generally George E. Woodbine, "The Origins of the Action of 
Trespass," 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 799,803 (1924) 
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an appeal as we know it. It was a criminal proceeding that a private person initiated to 
punish homicide, and it was used more often than an indictment for that 
purpose. 
The unintended side effects of the felony-merger rule may have made it 
often futile to seek compensation from the tortfeasor-felon. But it is wrong to equate the 
lack of an incentive to sue with the absence of a legal right to do so. Given both the 
confounding nature of Lord Ellenborough's ruling and its conflict with prior common law 
practice, some English judges have questioned whether his ruling was accurately 
reported.7 
The decision was a nisi prius ruling, meaning that it arose in a local less 
formal county trial conducted by a single judge. Not in the more formal context ofthe 
court sitting en bane at Westminster. Lord Ellenborough gave no reason for, and cited no 
precedent or other authority in support of his assertion. 
In Colonial America 
In any event, the American colonies won independence from England 
before Baker v. Bolton was announced by Lord Ellenborough as the state of British law 
circa 1808. More important, his conclusion was contrary to the practice that was followed 
by American courts before the Revolution and was based on early principles never 
adopted by the colonies. 
Not surprisingly, one leading constitutional scholar discovered that there is 
"no observation in colonial statutes or decisions lending any support to a belief that a 
7 See, e.g., Osborn v. Gillett, 8 L.R. 8 Exch. 88, 96 (1873) (Bramwell, B., dissenting) 
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death claim would have been denied by our colonial ancestors."8 
As Justice Joseph Story, one of the principal expositors of early U.S. law, 
emphasized, although "our ancestors brought with them [the] general principles [of the 
common law] and claimed it as their birthright; ... they brought with them and adopted 
only that portion which was applicable to their situation." Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 
137, 144 (1829). 
Colonial Compensation 
1n reality, the colonial practice required a person who had been convicted 
of homicide to compensate the victim's family - a form of a wrongful death action.9 
For example, in 1675, a Massachusetts Bay Colony court found a civil defendant liable 
for having "accidentally discharg[ed] guns at foules on ye neck thereby wounding 
Samuel Fflacks son so he died." The court ruled the tortfeasor should pay £10 to the boy's 
father. 10 
Numerous other 19th-century U.S. decisions during the 1800's permitted 
common law wrongful death actions. 11 For example, in 1825, a federal district court 
8 Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, note 10, 
at 1065-66 (emphases added) (1965) 
9 Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17 
STANFORDLAWREVIEW 1043, 1062-65 (1965) 
10 1 Mass. Ct. Assts. 54-$5 (1675) 
1l Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794) death of a wife three hours after surgery to 
remove a breast and breast tumor; it rejected the defense contention that the civil claim was 
barred by the felony-merger rule of England: "The rule urged by the defendant, is applicable, in 
England only .... "); see also Piscatauqua Bank v. Turnley, 1 Miles 312,316 (Phila. Dist. Ct. 
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justified its holding that a wrongful death action could be maintained in admiralty on the 
ground that the felony-merger rule had "never been adopted in this state" and was 
"entirely in opposition to the system of civil polity established in this country."12 
Other States Reject Felony-Merger 
In 1854, the Supreme Court of Georgia held the felony-merger rule was no 
bar to a wrongful death action caused by negligence or other noncriminal acts. Shields v. 
Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 355-56 (1854). The leading antebellum text on the law of domestic 
relations in the early 1800's made clear that the felony-merger doctrine was irrelevant in 
the United States.13 As one commentator correctly concluded, 
Ellenborough's blunt announcement that no civil action can 
be grounded upon the death of a human being not only 
lacked historical support at the time but was consistently 
ignored in America until 1848 ( and even later by the 
English courts), and during this forty-year interval [from 
1808 to 1848) there was no instance of a denial of civil 
action for wrongful death. 14 
How Things Got off Track 
In Carey v. Berkshire Railroad, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848), that U.S. 
1836); Fordv. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 163-
64 (1853); Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209, 212-13 (1860); Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 23 F. Cas. 
368, 371 (No. 13,599) (C.C. Neb. 1874) 
12 Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 895-96 (No. 11,234) (D. Me. 1825), dismissed on appeal for 
lack of admiralty jurisdiction, 19 F. Cas. 891 (No. 11,233) (C.C. D. Me. 1827) 
13 Reeves, Domestic Relations 377 (Am. ed. 1816) 
14 See generally, Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, 1067 (1965) (Emphasis added) 
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court decreed that no cause of action for wrongful death had existed at common law. 
Carey relied entirely on Baker v. Bolton. Other courts followed, citing Carey and Baker, 
even though the underlying felony-merger doctrine continued to be universally rejected 
by U.S. courts as having no application in this country. 
State wrongful death statutes were adopted in response to Carey and its 
progeny. 
Nonetheless, the myth that there was no common law action for wrongful 
death, and that legislatures accordingly have a free hand in establishing - and restricting 
- wrongful death recoveries, created the perverse situation that: "From the defendant's 
point of view it [is] cheaper to kill a person than to scratch him. "15 
Other scholars termed the rule "barbarous"16 and concluded that "no 
satisfactory reason for the rule has ever been suggested." 17 Indeed, a legal system that 
fully compensated even minor injuries while providing inadequate recovery for the 
ultimate personal injury--death--would seem to exemplify the very kind of arbitrariness 
condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases such as the recent Romer 
v. Evans. 26 
Moragne decision 
The U.S. Supreme Court aimed to level this topsy-turvy landscape. In 
Moragne, it expressly overruled its 1886 decision in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 
(1886), and held that the general maritime Jaw-one of the few areas of judge-made 
15 Prosser and Keeton, the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) 
16 Frederick Pollock, Law of Torts 55 (Landon ed., 1951 ). 
17 Francis Buchanan Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act §12 (2d ed. 1913). 
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federal common law - did afford a cause of action for wrongful death. 398 U.S. 375 
(1970). 
The Court based its ruling in large part on its reevaluation of both English 
and American legal history. Pointedly, that reassessment revealed that "the historical 
justification marshaled for the [felony-merger] rule in England never existed in this 
country." 398 U.S. at 384. As the Court explained, the absence of wrongful death suits 
"in primitive English legal history ... was based on a particular set of factors that had, 
[even in 1886], long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that had never 
existed in this country at all." 398 U.S. at 381. The Supreme Court stated: 
"The first explicit statement of the common-law rule 
against recovery for wrongful death came in the opinion of 
Lord Ellenborough, sitting at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, 
1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did 
not cite authority, or give supporting reasoning, or refer to 
the felony-merger doctrine in announcing that "in a civil 
court, the death of a human being could not be complained 
of as an injury." 
Following Moragne, several state courts have recognized that wrongful 
death actions are properly regarded as having their genesis in common law rights, not 
legislative largesse. Chief among those courts has been the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, whose erroneous 1848 decision in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad, 55 Mass. 
(1 Cush.) 475, 476-77 (1848) marked the first time a U.S. court embraced Lord 
Ellenborough's characterization of the common law and denied a widow the right to 
recover for the wrongful death of her husband holding it was only "an offense against the 
crown" and because it was a felony the felony "prevails over the wrong done to the 
master, and his action by that is gone* * * If these actions, or either of them, can be 
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maintained, it must be upon some established principle of the common law [but at 
common law] the death of a human being is not the ground of an action for damages." 
Carey started an erroneous trend that continued for decades. 
In 1972, two years after Moragne was decided, Massachusetts's high court 
expressly overruled Carey, observing that 
Upon consideration of the Moragne decision and the sound 
reasoning upon which it is based, we are convinced that the 
law in this Commonwealth has also evolved to the point 
where it may now be held that the right to recovery for 
wrongful death is of common law origin, and we so hold. * 
* * Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will no 
longer be regarded as "creating the right" to recovery for 
wrongful death. Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 
(Mass. I 972) 
Six years later, the Illinois Supreme Court described the view that 
wrongful death actions are wholly statutory in nature as "a much criticized concept 
stemming from questionable antecedents." Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790 
(Ill. 1978). 
The following year, the Supreme Court of Alaska in Haakanson v. 
Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11 (Alaska 1979) explained that it did 
not find that state's wrongful death statute to be in derogation of the common law, 
because "if there were no statute, we would in all probability follow the lead of the 
United States Supreme Court in Moragne." 18 
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Alaska again rejected the proposition that 
wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law and therefore should be 
18 Haakanson v. Wakefield Seqfoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11 
(Alaska I 979) 
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construed strictly. Hanenbuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'!, 694 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Alaska 
1984): 
In rejecting the application of the discovery rule in 
wrongful death actions, these cases proceed from the 
assumption that wrongful death is an exclusively statutory 
creation. Thus, as an integral part of the statute creating the 
action, a period of limitations has been imposed which is a 
condition of the right of action. [citations omitted]. The 
underlying reasoning is that wrongful death actions are 
created by statute in derogation of the common law and 
thus should be construed strictly. * * * We disagree with 
these cases, both in their characterization of the underlying 
assumptions of wrongful death actions and I their 
interpretation of the statutory language. 694 P.2d at 145-46 
Similarly, in 1985, the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that "it 
appears ... that reliance on Baker as the basis for lack of recovery at common law may 
be misplaced." Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 716 (Ariz. 1985). The 
court held that wrongful death "statute and precedent have combined to produce a cause 
of action with common law attributes." Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 
718 (Ariz. 1985). The court explained that even if the Arizona legislature had "believed 
that it was creating a new statutory right of action in enacting the Wrongful Death Acts," 
there was "no evidence to suggest that [the legislature] intended to occupy the field 
completely, thus leaving no room for future judicial initiative." Summerfield v. Superior 
Court, 698 P.2d 712, 717 (Ariz. 1985). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS A.§925, cmt. k (1979). 
Stare decisis is no bar 
To be sure, other courts have declined to follow Moragne, usually citing 
considerations of stare decisis and the longstanding nature of state wrongful death 
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statutes.19 But plaintiffs seeking to challenge the continued vitality--and constitutional 
legitimacy--of statutory limitations on conuuon law wrongful death claims ought not be 
deterred by either factor. After all, neither one impeded the Moragne Court from 
overruling an 84-year-old precedent. 
Indeed, neither stare decisis nor the mere passage of years provides 
sufficient justification for perpetuating Baker's inequitable results. The fact that it took 
more than 150 years for scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court to correct Lord 
Ellenborough's errors is no reason why other courts should continue to replicate his ( or 
perhaps his scribe's) mistakes. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of stare decisis should not stand as an insuperable shield 
against correcting injustice. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained, "Stare decisis 
is not an inexorable .conuuand; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical 
formula of adherence to the latest decision."' 20 
Automatic allegiance to dogma is particularly inappropriate where, as in 
this area, 
* state constitutional rights and not mere statutory interpretations 
are at issue;21 
19 See, e.g., Ecker v. Town of West Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Conn. 1987); 
Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510,516 (Mo. 1993); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, 
Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348,356 n.7 (Tex. 1990) 
20 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (citations omitted) 
21 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,828 (1991); See generally United States v. 
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* the sort of reliance interests that exist in cases involving 
property and contract rights are not present;22 
* relatively few courts have squarely addressed the issues or 
carefully surveyed the relevant history;23 and 
* new facts, specifically those about the customs observed by 
colonial American courts, have been uncovered.24 
Moreover, the common law has always been regarded as the special 
domain of the courts and been subject to judicial modification when society's needs 
dictate change. There is no legitimate reason for the courts to refrain from correcting 
judicial error and from returning to the proper historical understanding of wrongful death 
Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699 (1964); Smith v. Al/wright, 321 U.S. 649,665 (1944); 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2756 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
22 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. See generally Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 
382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 
(1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 4 72 
(1924); The Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 13 L. Ed. 1058 (1852) 
23 See generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993), citing 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 
483,493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Since none of our prior holdings is on 
point, the doctrine of stare decisis is not controlling." (citation omitted)). 
24 See generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ( citations omitted). 
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actions under the common law. 
If wrongful death suits are recognized as arising under the common law 
and not as being solely statutory in origin, then statutorily proscribed recoveries should 
be viewed not as a matter of legislative grace--as creating a remedy where none has 
existed before--but rather as caps on damages. 
In cases outside the wrongful death category, courts in many jurisdictions 
have invalidated damages caps and other restrictions on who can sue, when, and why. 
Courts have condemned these limitations as arbitrary measures that violate state 
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, the right to jury trial, and the right to 
a complete and certain remedy. Courts have also condemned these limitations as 
legislative remittiturs that invade the province of the judiciary, contrary to the separation 
of powers principle. 
The defense premise for dismissal of this action is the erroneous reliance 
on the Steele case and the erroneously perpetuated belief that a victim's injury claim 
expired with his death or the death of the tortfeasor. That, however, is not a valid basis 
under Idaho law or common law. 
With respect to defendants' claim for fees and costs, plaintiff respectfully requests 
that it be denied, since this appeal is not "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." 
Given the manifest injustice of the rule promoted by the defendants and supported by the 
lower court, coupled with the lack of precedent on the issue, this action is brought in 
good faith and attorney's fees are not warranted should this court side with defendants. 
There is sufficient ambiguity in the common law that, coupled with the manifest injustice 
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in the outcome in the lower court and the lack of controlling statute, this appeal is 
justified for express clarification of the law on the issue presented. 
Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court for relief from the unjust consequences of the 
rule advocated by defendants and asks for express clarification of the common law in 
Idaho on the issue presented. 
Dated: 
PAUL T. CURTIS 
Attorney for Appellant Leeann Craig 
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